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Abstract 
In modern firms the use of contests as an incentive device is ubiquitous. Nonetheless, 
recent experimental research shows that in the laboratory subjects routinely make suboptimal 
decisions in contests even to the extent of making negative returns. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate if changing how agents are endowed with resources can increase the efficiency in 
contests. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects are asked to allot 
costly resources (bids) in an effort to attain an award (prize). In line with other laboratory studies 
of contests, our results show that subjects overbid relative to theoretical predictions and incur 
substantial losses as a result. Making subjects earn their initial resource endowments mitigates 
the amount of overbidding and thus increases overall efficiency. Overbidding is also linked to 
gender with women bidding higher than men and having lower average earnings. Other 
demographic information such as religiosity and individual preferences towards winning and risk 
also contribute to excessive bidding. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of contests as an incentive device has garnered much attention by researchers. 
Certainly, competition as an incentive device often has advantages over other non-competitive 
incentive schemes (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). Even so, these 
advantages may be eliminated if the agents in these situations make systematically inefficient 
choices. Since the original studies of Bull et al. (1987) and Millner and Pratt (1989), a number of 
laboratory studies have shown that subjects make significantly higher bids than predicted.1 In 
some instances, the magnitude of overbidding is so high that subjects make negative expected 
payoffs. The fact that agents in these instances make decisions which generate negative payoffs 
is of paramount concern to the organizations which may employ contests as an incentive device 
and constitutes a problem of moral hazard which is of interest to management researchers and 
professionals. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate if changing how agents are endowed with 
resources can mitigate the inefficient use of costly resources in contests. To this end, we conduct 
a laboratory experiment where subjects either receive a windfall endowment or earn their 
endowment before participating in a lottery contest in order to win a prize. Furthermore, to 
analyze the impact of preferences and demographic variables we also conduct a demographic 
questioner and elicit preferences towards risk and winning. 
Our results indicate that when subjects earn their endowments overbidding decreases by 
around 11-16%. Demographic characteristics, such as gender and religiosity, and individual 
preferences, such as preferences towards winning and risk, are significant predictors of subjects’ 
bidding behavior in contests. Specifically, we find that subjects who indicate higher utility for 
                                                 
1 For a review of experimental findings on contests see Sheremeta et al. (2012). 
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winning or higher tolerance for risk make higher bids in contests. Surprisingly, demographic 
effects are even stronger than treatment effects, with women making 25% higher bids and more 
religious subjects making 26% lower bids. These findings contribute to the existing literature on 
overbidding and efficient contest design, as well as gender differences in competitive 
environments, which we discuss in the concluding section. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide brief literature 
review. Section 3 details the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 reports the results of 
the experiment and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The literature on contests has generally fallen into one of three categories: selection into 
contests, performance in contests, and efficiency of contests. Our study here focuses mostly on 
the last category which has received significantly less attention in the recent surge of research on 
contests. 
A number of studies have focused on how people self-select into contests depending on 
individual preferences and demographic characteristics. This strain of literature has likely been 
driven by the findings of gender differences in the decision to enter into competitive situations 
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). In particular, this line of literature has found that when given 
the choice, women more than men tend to select out of competitive compensation schemes and 
into schemes which reward individual productive behavior (e.g. piece-rate).2 These findings are 
important because they suggest an explanation for why so few women are represented in high 
                                                 
2The lone exception is the study by Price (2010) where the author fails to replicate the findings of Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2008) using the same experimental design. 
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paying competitive careers.3 In addition to gender, Dohmen and Falk (2011) find that when 
subjects have a choice between a fixed payment and a contest, they are more likely to enter the 
contest if they are less risk-averse, more productive and more optimistic. Bartling et al. (2009) 
and Balafoutas et al. (2012) further document that, controlling for beliefs, inequality averse and 
spiteful subjects are less likely to enter contests. In summary, the findings of the literature 
indicate that people self-select into contests depending on individual preferences and 
demographic characteristics. 
Studies examining performance in contests are mostly based on three canonical models: a 
lottery contest of Tullock (1980), a rank-order tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and an 
all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989). The common finding from studies on lottery 
contests and all-pay auctions is that subjects routinely overbid (equivalent to over-exerting 
effort) relatively to theoretical predictions (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Gneezy 
and Smorodinsky, 2006; Sheremeta, 2010, 2011; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Price and 
Sheremeta, 2011). In rank-order tournaments overbidding is not as severe (Schotter and Weigelt, 
1992; Orrison et al., 2004; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011), but it is still present in some studies 
(Chen et al., 2011).4 
As noted earlier, this study is more closely related to the literature on efficiency of 
contests. Recently, there have been several attempts to reduce overbidding in contests and thus to 
enhance efficiency. One way to do so is to allow subjects to have an extensive learning 
experience (Lugovskyy et al., 2010). Another way is to let them make decisions as groups, 
instead of individuals (Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010). However, even extensive learning and 
group decision-making do not completely eliminate the overbidding phenomenon. Finally, 
                                                 
3 For a thorough review of the gender and competition literature, see Niederle and Vesterlund (2011).  
4 A possible explanation why the magnitude of overbidding is not as severe in rank-order tournaments is that in 
these tournaments subjects effort is distorted by a random noise and efforts have a convex cost structure. 
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Sheremeta (2011) shows that constraining individual budgets (and thus constraining strategy 
space) can reduce overbidding in contests, but such a mechanism is very unlikely to be effective 
in the world of competitive capital markets where it is relatively easy to borrow money 
(D’Avolio, 2002). 
Our study examines whether overbidding can be reduced and efficiency can be enhanced 
when subjects earn their initial resource endowment (as it is usually the case in the real-world 
settings). The idea that costly decisions may be influenced by the origin and, in particular, the 
effort by which the endowment is received is attributed to Locke (1978). The idea is clear: 
subjects who have to work or earn money to make decisions in the experiment may choose to 
make different decisions than subjects who receive money for free. The experimental evidence 
suggests that this is indeed in the case. In dictator games, researchers have found that earning the 
endowment decreases subject’s contributions (Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2006). 
Earning the endowment has also been shown to have an effect on the risk taking behavior 
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990) and behavior of subjects in the second-price auction (Jacquemet et 
al., 2009). In public good games, Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2009) and Harrison (2007) 
documents that subjects who earn (or use their own) money are less likely to contribute to the 
public good. 5  In summary, most of the studies document that subjects who earn their 
endowments behave more in line with standard Nash equilibrium predictions. The purpose of our 
experiment is to examine whether the overbidding phenomena can be resolved when subjects 
earn their initial endowments before participating in lottery contests. 
  
                                                 
5 In contrast, some researchers do not find any significant effect of the endowment origin on subjects’ behavior in 
public goods and redistribution games (e.g. Clark, 1998, 2002; Rutström and Williams, 2000; Cherry et al., 2005). 
6 
 
3. Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures 
The experiment is based on the seminal rent-seeking lottery contest of Tullock (1980). 
We chose to work with this model for several reasons. First, as we already mentioned, the lottery 
contest of Tullock (1980) is the seminal model of rent-seeking and prior research shows that 
subjects systematically overbid in these contests resulting in compromised efficiency. Moreover, 
this overbidding constitutes a moral hazard problem about which managerial technicians are 
fully aware and, as such, captures a specific facet of the managerial profession which we find 
attractive. Finally, this particular model provides clear theoretical predictions for which to 
measure efficiency, while the structure of the contest is easy to understand for subjects in the 
laboratory. 
In a simple lottery contest, there are n risk-neutral players who compete for a prize value 
of v. Each player i makes an irreversible bid bi in order to increase the probability of winning the 
prize, which is modeled with the lottery contest success function pi= bi/∑bi. The expected payoff 
for player i is equal to the probability of player i winning, pi, times the prize valuation, v, minus 
bid, bi, i.e. E(πi) = piv - bi. The unique Nash equilibrium bid is b*=v(n-1)/n2 and the equilibrium 
expected payoff is E(π*)= v/n2. 
In each treatment of our experiment, there are n=4 players competing with each other for 
the prize of v=120 experimental francs. Therefore, the equilibrium bid is b*=22.5 and the 
expected payoff is E(π*)=7.5. A key feature of our experiment is that there is no theoretical 
reason why bidding would be different based upon how the subjects receive their endowments. 
Therefore, the equilibrium bid is constant across our treatments since it does not depend on how 
the subjects are endowed (see Table 1). 
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In the baseline Gift treatment, subjects received a free endowment as a show up fee of 
$20 to play the lottery contest for 30 periods, 5 of which were randomly selected for payment at 
the end of the experiment. In the Earn treatment, subjects earned their endowments through a 
real effort task: adding up sets of five randomly generated two-digit numbers by hand, as quickly 
as possible.6 In the Earn treatment, subjects received $0.85 per problem that they correctly 
answered during a timed ten-minute period. This piece-rate was chosen so that on average the 
subjects would attain a similar endowment to that of the other two treatments. Finally, in the 
Yardstick treatment, subjects earned their endowments through the same real effort task, 
however, this time subjects received a $20 if they correctly solved more problems than a 
predetermined amount in a timed ten-minute period. This predetermined hurdle was set at 2 
problems but the subjects were not made aware of this fact. This extremely low hurdle was 
chosen so that all subjects would earn the $20 endowment.  
The experiment involved 216 undergraduate subjects from Purdue University. The 
computerized experimental sessions were conducted in the Vernon Smith Experimental 
Economics Laboratory using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran 6 sessions of each of the three 
treatments. In each session, there were a total of 12 subjects and the session proceeded in four 
parts (or three parts in the Gift treatment). Instructions, available in the Appendix, were given to 
subjects at the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the instructions aloud. 
In the first part, subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury 
(2002).7 This method was used to elicit subjects’ risk preferences. In the second part, subjects in 
                                                 
6 This task is commonly used in the experimental literature because it is easy to explain, and there is substantial 
variability in individual performance that is due partly to skill and partly to effort (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
Cason et al., 2010). 
7 Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff 
with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across 
all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 0% chance of winning $3 and a 100% chance of winning $0, while the last 
lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. 
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Earn and Yardstick treatments earned money through adding up sets of five randomly generated 
two-digit numbers by hand. In the Gift treatment all subjects automatically were given the $20 
endowment. After learning how much money they have received, subjects participated in a total 
of 30 periods of the lottery contest. At the beginning of each period, subjects were randomly re-
grouped to form a 4-player group. Subjects were then allowed to make bids between 0 and 120 
for a prize of 120 francs. After all subjects submitted their bids, the computer chose the winner 
by implementing a simple lottery rule: the chance of receiving the prize was calculated by the 
number of francs a subject bids divided by the total number of francs all 4 subjects in the group 
bid. In the third part of the experiment, similar to Sheremeta (2010), subjects were asked to bid 
for a prize with a value of zero francs. Subjects were told that they would be informed whether 
they won the contest or not and that all subjects would have to pay their bids. This procedure was 
used to measure how important it is for subjects to win when winning is costly and there is no 
monetary reward for winning. 
At the conclusion of the experiment, 1 of the 15 lottery choices subjects made in part one 
was randomly selected for payment. Subjects were also paid for 5 of the 30 periods in part two 
and for the 1 decision they made in part three. The five rounds were selected randomly by 
picking five numbers out of a bingo cage. The earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate 
of 60 francs to $1. Average earnings were $20.37 per subject and the experiment lasted for about 
60 minutes. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Overview 
Table 1 summarizes average bids and payoffs. Overall, subjects in all treatments 
significantly overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction (for all treatments p-value < 
0.01).8 As a result of significant overbidding, average payoffs are negative. The persistence of 
overbidding is also shown in Figure 1, displaying the average bid over all 30 periods of the 
experiment. Although there is a declining trend, even in the last periods of the experiment 
subjects continue to substantially overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction.9 
It is also important to emphasize that bids appear completely inconsistent with play of a 
symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium. Figure 2 displays the distribution of bids in all treatments, 
and indicates that bids are distributed on the entire strategy space from 0 to 120. The distribution 
of bids is fairly similar across treatments. Such a high variance in individual bids and significant 
overbidding are consistent with previous results of lottery contest experiments (Davis and Reilly, 
1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011; Sheremeta, 
2011). 
 
4.2. Earned Endowment Effects 
The focus of this study is to determine if the origin of endowment influences the degree 
of overbidding in contests. Table 1 shows that subjects bid 16% less in the Yardstick treatment 
relative to the Gift treatment (36.4 versus 43.2). Similarly, subjects bid 11% less in the Earn 
                                                 
8 We ran a random effects model on a constant with clustered standard errors at the session level for each treatment. 
The constant coefficients for each treatment are higher than the predicted theoretical values as in Table 1 (all p-
values < 0.01). 
9 Based on the estimation of a random effects model where the dependent variable is a bid and the independent 
variables are a constant and a period trend, we find that the period trend is significant in two out of the three 
treatments (p-value < 0.01 for Yardstick and Earnings; p-value = 0.12 for Gift). 
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treatment relative to the Gift treatment (38.6 versus 43.2). It is also clear from Figure 1 that the 
average bids in the Gift treatment are higher than the average bids in the Yardstick and Earn 
treatments over most periods of the experiment. Nonetheless, as pointed out in Harrison (2007), 
we must be careful in looking at only average bids within our treatments in a repeated 
experiment such as ours. 
To formally test the differences in bids across treatments, we use a random effects model 
with standard errors clustered at session level, where the dependent variable is the bid and the 
independent variables are treatment dummy-variables and a period trend.10 The results of the 
estimation are reported in Table 2. Specification (1) shows results for a comparison of the Gift 
treatment to the pooled data of the Earn and Yardstick treatments. Subjects in the Gift treatment 
bid significantly higher than in the two treatments where they had to earn their money. This 
difference in bidding behavior seems to be strongest in the Yardstick data (specification 2), 
where on average after including controls subjects tend to bid 6.80 more francs in the Gift 
treatment relative to the Yardstick treatment. The difference between the Gift and Earn treatment 
in specification (3) fails to be significant at a traditional 5 percent level, with a p-value of 0.11.11 
Lastly, specification (4) indicates that bidding behavior across the Earn and Yardstick treatments 
is similar. 
 
4.3. Demographic Effects and Bidding Behavior 
In each experimental section, we elicited information about individual preferences for 
winning (Sheremeta, 2010) and risk (Holt and Laury, 2002). Also, at the end of the experiment 
                                                 
10 For a robustness check, we also tried to control for potential wealth effects by including correct problem counts. 
The number of correct problem counts in the Yardstick and Earn treatments is not correlated with bids. Moreover, 
the estimation results on all other coefficients are virtually the same and are available from the authors upon request.  
11 Restricting our analysis to only the last 15 rounds strengthens our results. In particular, all p-values of treatment 
effects are significant with p-values < 0.08.  
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we conducted a demographic questionnaire. The survey was composed of questions regarding 
gender, religion, major, classes and age. Table 3 provides a summary statistics of the information 
that we collected from subjects. Accounting for individual preferences and demographic 
differences, we find several surprising results. The estimation results of different random effect 
models, where the dependent variable is the bid and the independent variable are different 
individual characteristics, are reported in Table 4. In all regressions we cluster the standard errors 
at the session level, as well as control for treatment effects (by using treatment dummy-variables) 
and period trend. 
The estimation of specification (1) in Table 4 indicates a significant and positive 
correlation between the bid and the winning variable. The winning variable is measured by the 
bid for the prize value of 0 (the task that we presented subjects with at the end of thirty periods of 
bidding for the prize value of 120).12 The significant positive correlation between the bid and the 
winning variable suggests that subjects who value winning more make higher bids in lottery 
contests. This is consistent with previous findings of Sheremeta (2010) and Price and Sheremeta 
(2011). One may argue that winning coefficient is capturing confusion instead of a utility of 
winning. The problem with such an argument is that subjects participated in the contest with 
prize of 0 after they played other contests for 30 periods. Moreover, in estimation of 
specification (1) we use the quiz variable, measuring the number of correct quiz answers, to 
control for confusion.13 Although we find that subjects who understand the instructions better 
                                                 
12 Although subjects were explicitly told that they would have to pay their bids, we still find that 28% of all subjects 
made positive bids, with an average bid of 9.1 in the Gift treatment, 6.1 in the Yardstick treatment, and 8.3 in the 
Earn treatment. Moreover, there are no statistically significant differences in bidding between three treatments (all p-
values > 0.40). 
13 This is a measure of how well subjects understand the instructions. Before the actual experiment, subjects 
completed the quiz on the computer to verify their understanding of the instructions. If a subject’s answer was 
incorrect, the computer provided the correct answer. The experiment started only after all participants had answered 
all quiz questions. 
12 
 
make lower bids in contests, the significant winning coefficient suggests that winning is a 
component in a subject’s utility. 
Another strong predictor of subjects’ behavior in contests is risk preferences. The 
estimation of specification (2) in Table 4 indicates a significant and negative correlation between 
the bid and the safe variable. The safe variable is measured by the number of safe options that 
subjects chose in the Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation task (for the details see footnote 3).14 
A higher number corresponds to a higher level of risk-aversion. The significant negative 
correlation between the bid and the safe variable indicates that more risk-averse subjects make 
lower bids in contests. This finding is consistent both with theoretical predictions of Hillman and 
Katz (1984) and experimental findings of Sheremeta (2011) and Schmidt et al. (2011). 
Moreover, controlling for both safe and winning variables, we still find that both are significantly 
impacting individual bidding behavior (specification 3). 
In addition to winning and safe, in specification (4) of Table 4 we include different 
demographic characteristics summarized in Table 3. 15  The gender variable is an indicator 
variable, taking a value of 1 for women and 0 for men. The positive and significant correlation 
between the bid and the gender implies that women bid more than men. This difference is 
substantial in magnitude and it is persistent throughout the duration of the experiment (Figure 3). 
Remarkably, the gender effect is even bigger than the treatment effects (compare Figure 1 and 
Figure 3), with women making 25% higher bids than men (45.5 versus 36.3). Tis difference also 
holds across the treatments, with women bidding more than men in all three treatments. The 
gender difference is even more surprising given that we control for other demographic 
                                                 
14 In the experiment, the vast majority of subjects chose the safe option A when the probability of the high payoff in 
option B was small, and then crossed over to option B. 
15 In 3 out of 18 sessions, we did not conduct the demographic questionnaire. 
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characteristics as well as individual preferences.16 As a result of significantly higher bids, women 
receive lower average payoffs from the contest than men (-10.5 versus -8.9). 
A significant gender effect is found in studies of mathematical abilities, cognitive 
thinking, and probability evaluations (Geary, 1996; Kimura and Hampson, 1994; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2002; Powell and Ansic, 1997). In particular, there is evidence that men apply deeper 
mathematical reasoning and women are more risk-averse. The latter finding is unlikely to explain 
our results due to several reasons. First, based on a simple OLS regression with robust standard 
errors, we do not find a significant difference between risk preferences by men and women 
subjects (p-value = 0.71). However, even if women were more risk-averse it would not explain 
why they overbid more. The less risk-averse players are expected to bid less (not more) due to 
theoretical predictions (Hillman and Katz, 1984) as well as experimental findings (Sheremeta, 
2011; Schmidt et al., 2011). Mathematical reasoning, on the other hand, may be an important 
factor that influences men’s and women’s performance in contests. Unfortunately, we do not 
have data available to test this conjecture. 
More recent research indicates that women tend to shy away from competition. For 
instance, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that twice as many men as women choose the 
tournament over the piece-rate. The authors investigate several explanations for this difference 
including confidence, risk aversion, and feedback aversion; although in the end they attribute 
most of the impact to disparate preferences between the genders. Our findings provide an 
additional explanation of why women shy away from competition. Based on our findings, 
                                                 
16 It appears that the winning variable becomes insignificant when we control for demographic differences. Further 
investigation indicates that this is mainly because of the gender effect. Specifically, we find that women bid twice as 
much for the prize of 0 than men (9.75 versus 4.86). The correlation between the gender and winning variable may 
be due to women being more sensitive to the context of the experiment and they associated a bid of zero with doing 
nothing (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Future research is needed to investigate this result in more detail. 
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women earn lower payoffs in a tournament-like setting and thus they may rationally choose not 
to enter the tournament.17 
Our findings concerning gender in contests are also consistent with research on gender 
effects in auctions (Ham and Kagel, 2006; Casari et al., 2007; Charness and Levin, 2009; Chen et 
al., 2009; Ong and Chen, 2012). Ham and Kagel (2006) and Casari et al. (2007), for example, 
find that women are more susceptible to the winner’s curse. Controlling for individual ability and 
other factors, the authors conjecture that women’s overbidding in a common value auction may 
reflect a relative lack of familiarity with competitive market interactions. Overall, it seems that 
overbidding by women in auctions is a robust phenomenon (Charness and Levin, 2009; Chen et 
al., 2009). Although contests are rather different than auctions, it is intriguing to find similar 
gender effects in both environments. 
Finally, the religiosity variable, which measures the importance of religion in daily life, is 
significant in specification (3) of Table 4. Subjects who consider religion to be a very important 
part of their daily life make 26% lower bids in contests than others (32.5 versus 41.2).18 As with 
the gender effect, the religiosity effect (i.e., 26%) is bigger than the treatment effects (i.e., 11-
16%) and is persistent throughout the duration of the experiment (Figure 4).  
There are several reasons which may explain the significant difference in behavior of 
more religious subjects (Iannaccone, 1998). First, it is usually the case that most religions 
provoke people to care about and trust others (Tan and Vogel, 2008), as well as to be more pro-
social (Ahmed, 2009; Benjamin et al., 2012).19 This may produce less competitive behavior in 
                                                 
17 Gneezy et al. (2003) also document that more competitive environments cause a significant increase in efforts for 
men but not for women. 
18 We asked subjects to answer the question “How important do you consider religion in your daily life?”. Subjects 
then chose one of the following answers: (1) very important, (2) somewhat important, (3) a little important, and (4) 
not at all important. We code the variable religiosity as 1 if subject’s answer was (1) and 0 otherwise. 
19 Several experimental studies (Ahmed, 2009; Benjamin et al., 2012) find that more religious people behave more 
pro-socially by contributing more to the public good than less religious people. 
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contests from more religious subjects.20 It is also documented in the literature that more religious 
people are more compassionate towards the disadvantaged (Batson et al., 1993; Regnerus et al., 
1998). Therefore, we would expect that when confronted with other subjects in a contest, more 
religious subjects may yield the competition in favor of their counterparts.21 Disregarding the 
exact reasons why religiosity impacts individual bidding in contests, it is intriguing to know that 
it plays such an important role in bidding behavior of subjects in our experiment. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates whether the amount of overbidding in contests depends on the 
origin of the endowment and whether demographic differences and differences in preferences 
can explain bidding behavior of subjects. We find that when subjects earn their endowments 
overbidding decreases by around 11-16%. Demographic characteristics, such as gender and 
religiosity, and individual preferences, such as preferences towards winning and risk, are 
significant predictors of subjects’ bidding behavior in contests. Surprisingly, demographic effects 
are even stronger than treatment effects, with women making 25% higher bids and more 
religious subjects making 26% lower bids. 
Our results contribute to several areas of research. First, our study contributes to the 
discussion on how to reduce overbidding in contests and enhance efficiency. Our findings 
indicate that an important contributing factor to overbidding is the fact that subjects receive 
windfall endowments (house money) before participating in contests. When subjects earn their 
                                                 
20 Mago et al. (2012) and Savikhin and Sheremeta (2012) find that subjects exhibiting more pro-social behavior 
make lower bids in contests. 
21 Another explanation could be risk aversion, since religious people are usually more risk averse (Hilary and Hui, 
2009; Kumar et al., 2011). However, in estimating specification (3) of Table 4, we control for risk preferences. 
Moreover, based on a simple OLS regression with robust standard errors, we do not find a significant difference 
between risk preferences by religious and non-religious subjects (p-value = 0.39). 
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endowments the overbidding decreases by around 11-16%. Therefore, our results suggest that 
one way to increase efficiency in contests is simply by making subjects earn their endowments 
before participating in contests. This is particularly useful information for managers who are 
tasked with allotting costly resources to departmental units within an organization. 
Second, the results of our experiment can partially explain why all contest studies find 
that subjects’ behavior in contests is heterogeneous, with some subjects making very high and 
some making very low bids. A usual explanation for a high variance in individual bidding 
behavior is that subjects have heterogeneous preferences towards winning (Sheremeta, 2010) and 
risk (Sheremeta, 2011; Schmidt et al., 2011). We also find that subjects’ preferences towards 
winning and risk are significant predictors of individual bidding behavior. However, more 
importantly, we find that demographic differences, such as gender and religiosity, are significant 
predictors of subjects’ behavior in contests. Specifically, we find that women make 25% higher 
bids than men and subjects who consider religion to be a very important part of their daily life 
make more than 26% lower bids in contests. Remarkably, demographic effects are even bigger 
than the treatment effects, suggesting that in addition to heterogeneous preferences, a significant 
part of differences in individual bidding may be attributed to differences in demographic 
characteristics. This again is very important for the use and allocation of resources to 
departmental units within an organization. Just as the manager must allocate resources in a 
circumspect way, the manager must also anticipate how resources are to be used once they have 
been allocated within an organization. The evidence from this study suggests that an important 
aspect of this paradigm is to understand the preferences of those who make decisions about the 
use and allocation of costly resources. 
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Lastly, the results pertaining to gender contribute to the growing literature on gender 
differences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Specifically, our results show that in a contest setting 
women bid significantly more than men. As a result of significantly higher bids, women receive 
lower average earnings than men. This may affect women’s propensity to enter freely into 
similar contests and contribute to the discussion of gender preferences for competition.22 As 
outlined in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), the reluctance to commit to a competitive situation 
may be an important aspect of explaining the gender-wage disparity (Blau and Kahn, 2006) and 
low representation of women in top-level corporate management (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). 
In addition to the impact this study has on the current set of literature, this study also 
suggests advances in future research along two important dimensions. First, as noted above, we 
have investigated the impact of gender in relation to overbidding in contests. This study 
highlights a new avenue for studying gender differences in competition (e.g., Gneezy et al., 
2009). In particular, future work should consider how previous results concerning women’s 
preference to abstain from competition in wages is related to women’s overbidding in the context 
of contests. 
Second, this study also ties the contest literature to the discussion on religiosity. There is 
a growing number of experimental studies examining the impact of religion and religiosity on 
economic behavior (Hoffmann, 2012). Given that more than 60% of Americans self-classify as 
religious (Joas, 2008), it is imperative to investigate how religiosity impacts individual behavior 
in competitive environments. From the results of our experiment, it appears that religiosity is as 
important as gender in explaining individual behavior in contests. It occurs to us that 
                                                 
22 The fact that women perform in contests worse than men also suggests that there may be little demand for women 
in jobs where competition is present in wages. For details of this concern see Price (2012), where the author places 
subjects in an environment very similar to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) except that one subject (a manager) 
chooses a compensation scheme for another (a worker). 
18 
 
investigations of the impact of demographic factors, such as religiosity and gender, on decisions 
in competitive environments both inside and outside the laboratory are especially fruitful and 
insightful avenues for future research. 
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Table 1: Average Statistics 
 
Treatment Average  Endowment 
Average 
 Bid 
Average 
 Payoff 
Equilibrium  22.5 7.5 
Gift $20.00 (0.0) 43.2 (0.8) -13.2 (1.1) 
Yardstick $20.00 (0.0) 36.4 (0.7) -6.4 (1.1) 
Earn $18.53 (0.1) 38.6 (0.8) -8.6 (1.1) 
Standard error of the mean in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Treatment Effects  
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable, bid Gift vs. Yardstick & Earn 
Gift vs. 
Yardstick 
Gift vs. 
Earn 
Yardstick vs. 
Earn 
gift 5.70** 6.80** 4.60 
     [1 if Gift] (2.83) (2.97) (2.95) 
yardstick  -2.20 
     [1 if Yardstick]  (1.61) 
period -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.36*** 
     [period trend, t] (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
constant 42.17*** 40.84*** 42.61*** 44.15*** 
(1.63) (2.23) (1.91) (1.96) 
Observations 6480 4320 4320 4320 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the session level. All models include a 
random effects error structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account 
for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of Demographic Characteristics and Preferences 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
winning bid for the prize of 0 7.85 22.50 0 120 
quiz number of correct quiz answers 7.13 1.01 2 8 
safe number of safe options 9.35 2.47 1 15 
gender woman or man 0.35 0.48 0 1 
religiosity religion is very important 0.19 0.39 0 1 
denomination Christian or other 0.48 0.50 0 1 
major business or econ major 0.30 0.46 0 1 
class number of econ classes taken 3.50 4.13 0 25 
age participant’s age 20.85 1.80 18 33 
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Table 4: Determinants of Bids 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable, bid   
earn -5.59** -6.80** -5.59** -5.39 
     [1 if Earn] (2.83) (2.98) (2.85) (3.38) 
yardstick -3.58 -4.69 -3.64 -2.77 
     [1 if Yardstick] (2.92) (2.87) (2.90) (3.10) 
period -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.36*** 
     [period trend, t] (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
winning 0.15** 0.14** 0.11 
     [bid for the prize of 0] (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) 
quiz -5.41*** -5.64*** -4.95*** 
     [number of correct quiz answers] (1.71) (1.65) (1.84) 
safe  -2.10*** -2.14*** -1.92*** 
     [number of safe options]  (0.51) (0.56) (0.62) 
gender   7.14*** 
     [1 if women]   (2.76) 
religiosity   -7.90*** 
     [1 if religion is very important]   (2.84) 
denomination   -3.83 
     [1 if Christian]   (2.41) 
major   -1.74 
     [1 if business or econ major]   (4.18) 
class   -0.28 
     [number of econ classes taken]   (0.57) 
age   -1.20* 
     [participant’s age]   (0.68) 
constant 84.50*** 67.49*** 106.25*** 134.71*** 
(13.14) (5.74) (14.26) (18.26) 
Observations 6480 6480 6480 5400 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the session level. All models include a 
random effects error structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for 
the multiple decisions made by individual subjects. 
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Figure 1: Average Bid Across Periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Bids in Each Treatment 
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Figure 3: Average Bid by Gender (All Treatments Combined) 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 4: Average Bid by Religiosity (All Treatments Combined) 
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Appendix (Not for publication) – Instructions for Treatment Earn 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them closely and make appropriate 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in four parts. The currency used in Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment is U.S. 
Dollars. The currency used in Parts 3 and 4 of the experiment is francs.  At the end of the experiment, francs will be 
converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _60_ francs to _1_ dollar. Your earnings today will be calculated as the sum of 
your earnings in each part of the experiment. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in 
cash. 12 participants are in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation.  
At this time we will proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How 
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not 
designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what 
you really would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that 
there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment. You do not know 
which line will be paid when you make your choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in 
every line. After you have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage 
containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, 
you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings 
in the case you chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo 
cage now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in 
the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number 
shows up in the right column you earn $0. 
Are there any questions? 
 
Deci
sion 
no. 
Opti
on A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3 never $0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
2 $1 $3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage $0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
3 $1 $3 if 1 or 2 $0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
4 $1 $3 if 1,2,3 $0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
5 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4, $0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
6 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5 $0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
7 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6 $0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
8 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
9 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
10 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
11 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
12 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
13 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
14 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 $0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20
15 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 $0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
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For this part of the experiment you will be asked to calculate the sum of five randomly generated two-digit 
numbers. You will be given 10 minutes to calculate the correct sum for a series of these problems. You cannot use a 
calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to use the supplied scratch paper. You submit an answer 
by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer, the computer will immediately tell you 
whether your answer is correct or not and supply another summation problem. I will give notice when 30 seconds 
remain. 
YOUR EARNINGS 
You will receive $1 per problem that you correctly solve within the 10 minutes. Your payment does not 
decrease if you provide an incorrect answer to a problem.   
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 3 
YOUR DECISION 
You may have already earned some money from the first part of the experiment, although we will 
determine how much at the conclusion of the experiment.  In addition to this amount, you have also earned some 
money from the second part of the experiment.  In part 3 of the experiment, you may receive either positive or 
negative earnings. 
The third part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the beginning of each period, 
you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 participants. The composition of your group will 
be changed randomly every period. The reward is worth 120 francs to you and the other three participants in your 
group. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 120 (including 0.5 decimal points). An example of 
your decision screen is shown below. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of 
who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. Thus, your period earnings will be calculated in 
the following way: 
 If you receive the reward:      Earnings = Reward – Your Bid = 120 – Your Bid 
 If you do not receive the reward:     Earnings = No Reward – Your Bid = 0 – Your Bid 
Remember, in the first and second part of this experiment you have earned money.  In this part of the 
experiment, depending on a period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the 
experiment we will randomly select 5 out of 30 periods for actual payment.  You will sum the total earnings for 
these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment.  If the earnings are negative, we will subtract them from 
your earnings.  If the earnings are positive, we will add them to your earnings. 
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The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participants in your 
group bid, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one 
lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 
4 participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 120 francs. Thus, 
your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs 
all 4 participants in your group bid. 
Your chance of 
receiving a reward = 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 4 Bids in your group 
If all participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the four participants in the group. 
 
Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw. Let’s say 
participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, participant 3 bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs. 
Therefore, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets 
to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 
65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. 
Participant 2 has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 chance, and participant 3 has 0 = 0/65 chance 
of receiving the reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who 
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you 
received the reward or not. 
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether you received the reward or 
not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is 
displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate 
heading. 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of 
each period you will be randomly re-grouped with three other participants to from a four-person group. You can 
never guarantee yourself the reward. However, by increasing your bid, you can increase your chance of receiving 
the reward. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment in Part 3 
using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
Are there any questions? 
30 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 4 
The fourth part of the experiment consists of only 1 decision-making period and only one stage. The rules 
for part 4 are the same as the rules for part 3. At the beginning of the period, you will be randomly and 
anonymously placed into a group of four participants. You will bid in order to be a winner. The only difference is 
that in part 4 the winner does not receive the reward. Therefore, the reward is worth 0 francs to you and the other 
three participants in your group. After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are 
calculated. 
Earnings = 0 – Your Bid 
After all participants have made their decisions, you will learn whether you win or not. The computer then 
will display your earnings for the period on the outcome screen. Your earnings will be converted to cash and paid at 
the end of the experiment. 
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